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The ruler doesn’t want from the thinker free thinking.  He 
wants his loyal thinking.
Tawfiq al-Hakim, A‘wdat al-Wa‘y (The Return of 
Consciousness)
The modern intellectuals’ crisis has roots that lie in the 
past, when the pro-authority Arab intellectuals’ predecessors 
instilled in them the fact that power is always a prerequisite 
for the nation and should be divinely and earthly sustained. 
This has been engraved in the mindset for generations, and 
I would suggest that the continuity of this notion in the socio-
political tradition needs to be reconsidered as a major factor 
in the formulation of the Arab intelligentsia. In short, I believe 
that the present for Arab intellectuals is a continuation of their 
past.  This paper will provide a synthesis of different positions 
of Arab intellectuals, with emphasis given to the suitability 
and continuity of Arab tradition in the present condition of the 
modern Arab intellectuals.
Since the beginning of 2011, the revolutionary upheaval of 
the Arab peoples reflects a serious crisis in both the political 
and cultural realms of the Arab world.  The projects of Arab 
intellectuals in rationalism and enlightenment have obviously 
failed in dealing with the sudden and dramatic transformation 
on the ground in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Oman, and 
Syria.  This spontaneous transformation of the Arab societies, 
which observers in the U.S. and Europe have analogized as 
‘the Arab Spring(2),’ declares the death of established myopic 
ideologies, politically and culturally respectively.  Therefore, the 
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current situation raises significant questions 
about the future role of the Arab intelligentsia: 
What are the mechanisms through which 
this element has been working over the past 
several decades?  What kind of relationships 
do they have with political authorities?  Is their 
attitude anachronistic? Or are they simply 
faithful to inherent Arab tradition regarding the 
‘culture-politics’ correlation? 
The factors that form the relationship 
between the intellectual and authority need 
to be further examined, because there are 
multiple and complex interactions that contain 
ramifications rooted in history, culture, and 
modern relations of what is happening in the 
social body and political community.  This 
study focuses on evaluating the presence 
of Arab-Islamic intellectual traditions, as 
they are manifest in the realm of modern 
Arab intellectuals.  This approach helps 
in understanding and accommodating the 
confusing relationship between the Arab 
intellectual and authority in their moments of 
cooperation and antagonism.  Though the 
modern correlation of intellectual-authority 
is typically conceptualized as a relationship 
divided along oppressed-oppressor or even 
opponent-proponent intellectual nexus, in fact 
the history and culture context is subtler and 
more complicated.  This study focuses on 
the implied system that formulates and limits 
the effectiveness of the Arab intellectuals 
and their (political and social) activities.  It 
examines one aspect of the problem of Arab 
intellectuals with regard to their involvement 
with authority.  It also scrutinizes an implied 
system that stems from the Arab tradition and 
governs the state-intellectual relations.
The role of the modern Arab intellectuals 
flourishes as a conflict intensifies over a 
particular issue; because the intellectuals 
repeal their role as idea producers, 
they no longer think or rethink their own 
ideas, but receive the politically dominant 
discourse.  Therefore, the intellectuals are 
incorporated into the projects sponsored by 
the administrative elite and become state 
employees that receive patronage for their 
services.  They have a specific task to perform 
in accordance with the rigid instructions of the 
state.  According to the policy of integration of 
the intellectual into the state, he becomes an 
‘ideas keeper,» to use ‘Ali Harb’s wording(3), 
and not an idea producer. This is because the 
prevailing authority has already generated the 
ideas. All the intellectual has to do is to promote, 
protect, and sanctify these preexisting ideas. 
There is an implied system that orients the 
acts of the Arab intellectuals in their interaction 
with the power and society.  This hypothesis 
explores the reasons behind the cultural crisis 
of Arab intellectuals and their relationship with 
the modern states.  It is an attempt to examine 
a crucial tradition in the power-intellectual 
correlation is the continuity of a traditional 
implied system, which the establishment of 
an Islamic state initiated.  Additionally, it is 
partially responsible for formulating the role 
and practice of the Arab intellectuals.  This 
traditional sub-system traces back to the 
founding of the imperial Islamic caliphate 
and the establishment of the boards of 
administrations (dawawin).  Not only does it 
shape the intellectual’s role, but also it has a 
remarkable impact on the concrete basis of 
I believe that the present for Arab 
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the future position of the Arabs’ political, social 
and religious structure.  Therefore, in order 
to determine the current concept of the role 
of intellectuals, it is necessary to revisit their 
past role in the course of Islamic tradition. 
Such reference, I believe, ought to be taken 
into account to extract the sub-system that 
has been flowing underneath the political-
cultural activities.  A further examination 
entails that the uninterrupted presence of the 
culture-state relationship sub-system set up 
a firm foundation that could not be eliminated 
or even shaken by the establishment of the 
modern states.
Political oppression managed to prevent 
any opposition and any unified voice to act as a 
different thought or way of thinking.  The often 
horrendous and violent  state-oppression 
created a type of single-mindedness in all 
aspects of the system.  A prime example 
of this is evidenced 
by cultural life in Iraq 
during the 1980s until 
2003 when the faltering 
r e g i m e  c o l l a p s e d 
through war.  Once the 
oppressive machine 
had fallen apart, the 
oppressors, whether 
they were former security officers or simply 
intellectuals, moved to gather its disassembled 
parts in a last attempt to subjugate Iraqis. 
However, when Coalition Forces firmly 
established the new political path was and 
new Iraqi political parties began to rise, the 
only sanctuary for Iraqi intelligentsia was 
to portray themselves as victims to gain the 
benefits of reconciliation in post-Saddam Iraq.
Saddam Hussein enacted laws with 
merely a swift stroke of his pen. The objective 
correlative of such a disastrous way of 
thinking, so to speak, was the enthusiastic 
corroboration of the Iraqi intellectuals through 
a similar swift motion of a pen, not to enact new 
laws, but to produce a hypocritical pseudo-
justification of their master›s scribbled laws.  It 
is not an exaggeration to say that there was 
no awareness of the absence of a sense of 
responsibility among the Iraqi intellectual 
elite in both the academic and non-academic 
institutions.  Very few of them had asserted 
that the oppressive authority of the Ba‘th 
Party could utilize even the intellectuals’ shy 
repulsion of any cooperation with the regime 
to pulverize them. Therefore, they went into 
deep silence until death.  This situation may 
be illustrated by two individual examples: ‘Ali 
al-Wardi (19131995-), the charismatic Iraqi 
sociologist and historian, and Mahmud al-
Brekan (19272002-), the well-known Basran 
poet.(4) 
On the other hand, 
one may approach 
the intellectuals’ 
cooption collectively by 
examining the attitude 
of the Iraqi Communists’ 
intellectuals in their 
struggle with the Ba‘th 
Party in the 1970s. The long violent struggle 
between the Communists and Ba‘thists, 
especially the 1963 Ba‘thist atrocities against 
the Communists, ended in an alliance through 
the signing of the Nationalist Progressive Front 
(al-Jabhah al-Wataniyyah al-Taqaddumiyyah) 
in 17 July 1973.  The policies of the Nationalist 
Front enabled the Ba‘thists to remove the 
Iraqi Communist Party-Central Committee 
and completely destroy it as a threat to their 
regime. This alliance was rejected by the 
other communist faction, which was the Iraqi 
This study focuses on evaluating 
the presence of Arab-Islamic 
intellectual traditions, as they are 
manifest in the realm of modern Arab 
intellectuals
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Communist Party-Central Leadership.(5)  Only 
three years later, in 1976, the Ba‘thists initiated 
a wide ranging violent campaign against 
the remaining Communists that eventually 
dissolved the Iraqi Communist Party in the 
coming years.(6)
The multilateral silence of the Iraqi 
intelligentsia created a bizarre consent toward 
the authoritative oppression; it was meant to 
be a kind of self-defense, but it was an ego 
protection.  Iraqi Intellectuals also developed 
a collective sense that authorial oppression of 
this kind was not unprecedented in previous 
periods.  By this, they attempted to create 
a stronger theoretical pretext to justify their 
consent through the arguments their silence 
and cooperation were expressions of the 
natural human instinct for survival.  In short, 
the cooption and coercion of Iraqi intellectuals 
have been the predominant characteristics in 
the relationship between culture and power. 
Nevertheless, the Iraqi literary critic and 
thinker Muhsin al-Musawi tends to believe that 
there has been and is a dialectic relationship 
between culture and power in Iraq.(7)  Although 
he recognizes the challenge of writing on 
the relationship between culture and power, 
al-Musawi involves history as one of the 
challenges that shapes the discussion along 
with religion, ethnicity, social classes, and 
ideology.(8) In the midst of all these challenges, 
the dialectic relation between culture and 
power seems to be marginal and limited.
In Saudi Arabia, the intellectuals have 
the same multilateral silence and ‘bizarre’ 
consent toward the oppressive authority, 
but it is not justified within a self-defense 
pretext. It actually can be explained through 
an implied conformity among the majority of 
Saudi intellectuals with the state policies and 
strategies.  Not far from Saudi Arabia, Iraqi 
intellectuals’ responses, contributions, or 
participation in Iraq’s catastrophic wars have 
led to a traumatized country that could be easily 
led by the outmoded ideologues of those who 
stood on ideological pulpits wrapped in their 
illusions to revitalize the ugly spirit of killing. 
The violence of the Saddam era and the Iraqi 
intellectuals response, begs the question did 
they develop an eccentric indifference toward 
reality during the 1980s and 1990s, flagrant 
moral failures, or were there actions a natural 
response from fragile human beings?
The typical question of Arabic thought 
dealt with the intellectual-authority correlation 
in terms of current ideology, politics, and 
national interests.  However, I would prefer to 
formulate this question in terms of an implied 
influence of the past tradition on contemporary 
intellectuals. Ultimately the crises of Arab 
intellectuals are at least partially rooted in 
the precedents of Arabic-Islamic culture.  It 
is extremely important to understand that this 
link between Arab intellectuals present and 
past does not mean their embracement of 
Arab tradition and their attempts to reproduce 
it in the contemporary discourse, or what 
is known as the discourse of originality (al-
asalah) in opposition to the discourse of 
contemporariness (al-mu‘asarah). It rather 
means that a certain relevant convergence has 
enticed modern Arab intellectuals to internalize 
in order to determine the current 
concept of the role of intellectuals, it 
is necessary to revisit their past role 
in the course of Islamic tradition
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the past mechanisms of the production of the 
discourse itself, even when they maintain a 
sustainable relationship with the concept of 
contemporariness, modernization, and the 
values of modern enlightenment.  This is 
reflected most clearly in the nature of their 
relationship with authority; they more likely 
tend to strengthen their links with the ruling 
class more than to develop an authentic 
vision that can be achieved symbolically and 
realistically. Worldly interests have absorbedly 
covered their thoughtful visions. 
Their predecessor, the old Arab intellectual, 
was normally commencing his cultural life 
through subservience and service to the 
governor (al-wali), as preliminary training 
and preparation for his desired major step to 
the caliph’s court.  At the caliph’s court, all 
performed the same function, representing 
the authority’s vision, whether the intellectual 
was a scholar, jurist, poet, writer, or singer. 
Similarly, the modern Arabic intellectual is 
keen to link his activities to the prevailing 
authority voluntarily or involuntarily, and he is 
well-prepared to sacrifice his independence. 
In this essential junction, he follows the 
shadows of his predecessors, those who were 
included in the circle of the Caliph’s entourage 
or retinue (hashiyah(9)), and his intimate friends 
(nadama), were incorporated into the space 
of power and appointed to the service of the 
ruler.  Nonetheless, the few exceptions that 
represent the position of the past intellectuals 
and their independent attitudes, which 
opposed the power of ‘mainstream’ views, can 
be compared with the few exceptions of the 
modern Arab intellectuals.  
The conflict between the modern and 
traditional intellectual as two diverse 
representatives of the Arab renaissance in 
the 20th century deepens the Arab cultural 
crisis.  It is another factor that unbalanced the 
development of the notion of the intellectual. 
One may recall Antonio Gramsci (18911937-) 
and his note about a distinct development 
of the notion of the intellectual, which 
existed in the United States.  The American 
intellectuals emerged within “the absence 
of traditional intellectuals” on “an industrial 
base.”(10) Neither of these two decisive 
elements in the formation of the intellectual’s 
notion exists in the context of the formation 
of the modern Arab intellectual. Instead, the 
modern Arab intellectuals have witnessed a 
struggle between traditionists and modernists. 
Fatimah al-Muhsin’s Tamath-thulat al-
Nahdhah fi Thaqafat al-‛Iraq al-Hadith (The 
Representatives of Renaissance in the Culture 
of Modern Iraq) emphasizes the fact that the 
culture of the so-called ‘Iraqi renaissance’ was 
established on a polarization between the 
elements of traditional tendency and elements 
of modernization.  The ideas of modernization 
and progressiveness had influenced a wide 
range of writers and intellectuals, including 
the clergy.  The interference between the 
traditionalist and modernist elements emerged 
within the educated class as a whole, and 
within the active individual, who commands 
the promotion and propagation of the new 
ideas and values.(11)
The long violent struggle between 
the Communists and Ba‘thists, 
especially the 1963 Ba‘thist atrocities 
against the Communists, ended in an 
alliance 
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Let us examine another aspect of this 
question and contemplate the attitude of the 
esteemed Egyptian intellectual and writer 
Tawfiq al-Hakim. Tawfiq al-Hakim harshly 
criticized and degraded King Faruq (1920-
1965). Although he was part of the new power 
structure following the military coup in 1952, 
he eventually held the same negative feelings 
toward the revolutionary leader Gen. Jamal 
‘Abd al-Nasir.  Al-Hakim openly criticized King 
Faruq’s politics and barefacedly degraded 
him by describing his «filthy morals and his 
sagging body like a pig.»(12)  However, al-
Hakim’s book, ‛Awdat al-Wa‛y (The Return 
of Consciousness), introduced his late 
impressions and insights, twenty years after 
the 1952 revolution.  It presents the insights of 
a man who has fully contemplated the tragic 
consequences of that military coup.  At first, 
Tawfiq al-Hakim was «fascinated» by the 
military, but later he realized that he did not 
pay attention to the loss of the «constitutional 
life,»(13) which King Faruq had violated first, 
but was entirely crushed under the military 
coup.  Al- Hakim described Gen. Nasir twenty 
years later: «He was solely and innately giving 
speeches for long hours making us heroes 
under his leadership, while superpowers 
around us appear dwarfs.  We used to 
applaud with admiration and pride.  And 
when he vehemently said to a powerful state 
that [he] has atomic bombs: ‘If they are not 
satisfied with our actions, let them drink from 
the sea,’ we were filled with pride.»(14)  The 
vital attitude of the intellectual here was late by 
twenty years. During these years, everything 
was collapsing before the intellectuals’ eyes, 
but they were kidnapped by the varnish of 
a ‘revolution.’  However, al-Hakim’s The 
Return of Consciousness had set the stage 
impressively for significant revelations about 
rethinking the intellectuals’ convictions.
Another example of an Iraqi poet, quite 
exemplary in this context, is Muhammad 
Mahdi al-Jawahiri (19001997-). Al-Jawahiri 
is the most renowned poet in Iraq’s modern 
era; he was blessed, or cursed, to have 
lived a prolonged life and witness a century 
of Iraqi’s modern history. He started his 
work with King Faisal’s (18831933-) royal 
court and was occupied by Iraq and Arab 
issues for entire career. In his Thikrayati (My 
Memoirs), al-Jawahiri declared his remorse 
for rejecting the position of Representative in 
the Iraqi Parliament during the Monarchy. He 
obviously had reservations of the traditional 
Arab’s attitude in general and Iraqi society’s 
attitude in particular, towards intellectuals 
serving the government.  For the society, al-
Jawahiri emphasizes, cannot accept the fact 
that one can be simultaneously with rulers and 
the people.(15)
For the past six decades, successive 
political regimes in Arab countries have 
imposed centralized cultural and educational 
systems based on promoting the mainstream 
ideologies.  Apart from some isolated incidents, 
the Arab intelligentsia did not have contentious 
confrontations that have made any change to 
the furious governmental attempts to reshape 
the culture according to specific ideologies. 
Theoretically speaking, each of these Arab 
regimes, particularly the republican regimes, 
the cooption and coercion of Iraqi 
intellectuals have been the predominant 
characteristics in the relationship 
between culture and power
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proclaimed itself an exclusive legitimate 
authority. Each further claimed they could 
protect the interest (interests) of the Arab 
nation, achieve ‘glorious goals,’ and thereby 
restore the glorified past of the Arabs. 
However, in practice none has ever been able 
to create a mutual understanding of central 
issues that could lead to a possible ‘road 
map’ for navigating their subsequent crises. 
In the midst of the Arab regimes’ debates, 
the intellectuals claimed for themselves the 
exclusive and legitimate authority to protect 
the interests of the Arab nation.  Naturally, 
none has ever been able to do so.
The intellectual-power relations have 
created an endless stream of disagreement and 
contention ranging from stern condemnation 
to killing.  The detriment to the both, along with 
the society as a whole, has been immense. 
One example can be found in the idealism 
of ‘Ali Harb’s criticism of the intellectual, 
a criticism that gains a large portion of its 
legitimacy due to the ill-conceived intellectual-
power theorization.  Precisely, he assigns 
the same role that is played by power to the 
intellectual.  While this theory aggravated 
the understanding of the intellectual›s role 
and made it more ambiguous, it may portray 
‘Ali Harb as a power-support thinker.  It can 
also be understood as a reaction to the state 
policies and programs in reshaping the culture 
in conformity with the mainstream ideologues. 
Thus, some intellectuals developed an 
approach that assumed the cultural 
power as an attempt to define their 
own exclusive shares of authority. 
‘Ali Harb wages this war, not against 
the state authority as one may tend to 
think, but against the intellectuals and 
their projects and proclamations.  First 
of all, he connects the rise of the profession of 
the intellectual in the modern Arab world with 
the predominance of the ‘struggle mentality’ 
(nidhal) that has been embraced by those who 
work in cultural fields.»(16)  Then, he declares 
the major failure of Arab culture to develop 
its own self-criticism and the «end» of the 
intellectual. A new task of intellectuals, ‘Ali 
Harb believes, has to reshape their role and 
relationship to the core values, the values of 
freedom and justice, and their relationship to 
the political and social environment.(17)
The expansion of the concept of the 
intellectual has always been a task in itself. 
Gramsci expands the notion of intellectual as 
he redefines the term and calls for an ‘organic 
intellectual,’ who is engaged in reality to 
change it.  He raised the question, “What are 
the utmost limits of the meaning of the term 
‘intellectual?’(18)  Gramsci acknowledges that 
no single criterion can set some limits for the 
intellectuals’ activities.  In fact, he incorporates 
intellectuals’ activities with the activities of the 
social groups.  Therefore, he emphasizes the 
fact that the intellectuals’ activities are located 
within a system of relations, which reflects 
the intrinsic nature of intellectuals’ activities. 
Gramsci states:
“The intellectuals have a function in the 
‘hegemony’ that is exercised throughout society 
by the dominant group and in the ‘domination’ 
over society that is embodied by the state, and 
this function is precisely ‘organizational’ or 
At the caliph’s court, all performed the same 
function, representing the authority’s vision, 
whether the intellectual was a scholar, jurist, 
poet, writer, or singer
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connective.  The intellectuals have no function 
of organizing the social hegemony of a group 
and that group’s domination of the state.”(19)
This kind of intellectual should be very 
interested in public relations, public activities, 
and public domination.  On the contrary, 
Julien Benda (18671956-) designates a 
specific meaning to the term ‘the clerks’ as 
a disinterested, unbiased intellectual who 
works without personal interests: a utopian 
intellectual who is, writes Benda, “being 
set apart, someone able to speak the truth 
to power, a crusty, eloquent, fantastically 
courageous, and angry individual for whom 
no worldly power is too big and imposing to 
be criticized and pointedly taken to task”.(20) 
Benda used the term ‘the clerks’ by which he 
means:
“… all those whose activity essentially is 
not the pursuit the practical aims, all those 
who seek their joy in the practice of an art or a 
science or metaphysical speculation, in short 
in the possession of non-material advantage, 
and hence in a certain manner say: ‘My 
kingdom is not of this world.’”(21)
However, Benda notices that the European 
clerks, at the end of nineteenth century, 
immersed themselves in politics and “began 
to play the game of political passions.”(22)  His 
attitude involves the dimension of morality as 
this essential change of intellectuals’ function 
turned them to be stimulators of ‘the realism of 
the people’ rather than checking on it.  
Overall, Benda’s mode of intellectual 
emanates from his deep condemnation of 
wars and injustice to which the intellectuals 
contributed; especially First World War and the 
well-known Dreyfus Affair.  But, if the intellectual 
is not an ‘organic’ nor a ‘master of truth’ (i.e. 
a consciousness or conscience, nor a Marxist 
one who is aligned with universal missions), 
then Michel Foucault calls for another mode of 
intellectuals: A ‘specific intellectual’ in the face 
of a ‘universal intellectual.’(23)  The specific 
intellectual is situated within specific sectors 
that represent his work or environment such 
as the university, the laboratory, hospital 
etc.  So this mode of intellectual encounters 
different problems and questions which are not 
universal, but specific.  Hence, the intellectual 
as a writer is questioned or even voided in 
this context, because specific intellectuals are 
now doctors, psychiatrics, Magistrate, social 
workers, sociologists, and so on. Foucault’s 
concept can be partially involved in Gramsci’s 
argument because the ‘specific intellectual’ is 
capable of utilizing his specialty in the public 
domain.
Edward Said tried to create a conceptualized 
intellectual that is located among Gramsci’s, 
Benda’s, and Foucault’s intellectuals, (i.e. 
not organic, neither utopian nor specific, but 
an independent one). He characterized the 
intellectual as an “exile and marginal, as 
amateur, and as the author of a language 
that tries to speak the truth to power”.(24) 
Nonetheless, Edward Said’s intellectual 
can be identified as Russell Jacoby’s ‘public 
intellectual’, the one who contributes to open 
discussion.(25)  Edward Said combines the 
intellectual as a member of academe and the 
Tawfiq al-Hakim was «fascinated» by 
the military, but later he realized that 
he did not pay attention to the loss of 
the «constitutional life
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intellectual as amateur, 
or as Russell Jacoby’s 
public intellectual, 
especially when the 
latter characterizes the 
public intellectual as “an 
incorrigibly independent 
soul answering to no one.”(26)
While Fawzi Karim found in Benda’s The 
Betrayal of the Intellectuals a discovery(27) and 
a foundation to support his skeptical attitude 
towards Arab intellectuals and their passions 
and positions, ‘Ali Harb switched the debate 
about the state-intellectual relations.  The latter 
tried to go beyond the dichotomy of intellectual 
and authority, because it is no longer viable, 
and it obliterates his objective in questioning the 
intellectual himself. Indeed, his questioning is 
somehow a self-criticism that is constituted by 
an intellectual and addressed to intellectuals. 
It is more connected to the intellectuals’ 
predicament than to their engagement with 
the authority.  Nevertheless, Fawzi Karim 
also found in Benda’s analysis, of the political 
passions of the intellectuals, a solid ground to 
express his rejection of the use of passions 
that stem from ideologies or political parties. 
He considered the use of political passions 
and parties affiliation as a ‘European sin’ that 
also has ‘genuine and deep roots in Arab soil’.
(28)  Since Fawzi Karim has been meticulously 
preoccupied by the universal over the partial 
and by spiritual over practical, viewing that the 
Arab intellectuals resembling the Europeans 
intellectual characterized by Benda (i.e. they 
betray their role as they glorify the partial 
over the universal and the practical over the 
spiritual).(29)
‘Ali Harb is strongly convinced about the 
intellectuals’ use of ‘symbolic violence’ to 
impose their projects. 
One may argue that 
it is not persuasive 
to include the 
intellectuals’ activities, 
as such, within the 
physical coercive realm 
of political activities. However, he initiated a 
debate of this magnitude based on myopic, 
one-sided, observation.  Indeed, there 
has been a failure to observe the manifest 
distinction between the physical coercion and 
symbolic coercion. By the wording of ‘symbolic 
violence’, Harb means the violent written ideas 
that reflect the violence of the intellectual’s 
entire project. Accordingly, ‘Ali Harb might 
be seen as a tacit defender of the political 
authority.  Under the ideal of defending human 
rights, Harb argues intellectuals establish their 
own authority over the people.  For him, the 
authority’s unequivocal coercion is imposed 
over the populace, including the intellectuals’, 
whereas the intellectuals’ resentment is 
expressed by an equivocal coercion (i.e., by 
condemning injustice and demanding liberty). 
The intellectuals and authority perceive a 
competition over manipulating the populace, 
as a property that could be annexed to their 
powers.  The populace becomes a battlefield 
where the two rivals wage their wars in the 
name of the people’s interest, each claiming 
to have no ambitions but taking care of the 
people. However, the conflict will definitely 
be less favorable when their interests do 
not coincide, the tragic history of the state-
intellectual correlations lead us to firm 
predictions that they both would use violence.
It is not uncommon to say that authority 
uses violence against the intellectual who 
rejects its policies or has misgivings about its 
legitimacy. However, it is uncommon to say 
al-Jawahiri declared his remorse 
for rejecting the position of 
Representative in the Iraqi 
Parliament during the Monarchy
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that the intellectual also uses violence against 
the authority.  The violence of the intellectual 
is symbolic that tries to create a complete 
break with the ideological constraints. This 
intellectual practiced violence is incorporated 
in the struggle for freethinking that is advocated 
by the intellectual himself. However, ‘Ali Harb 
rethinks this symbolic violence and concludes 
that it is, in fact, a kind of intellectual tyranny 
in comparison to political tyranny; or two sides 
of the same coin. They are in actuality the 
tyranny of the intellectual and the tyranny of 
the politician.(30)  
Parallel to the active intellectual, there is the 
reclusive solitary intellectual whom turns away, 
as much as he can, from both unjust power 
and the society of others, living in solitude. 
This kind of intellectual co-exists with tyranny 
by voluntarily disabling the effectiveness of 
his role.  The reclusive and solitary intellectual 
attempts to completely withdraw, because 
repressive power attempts to shape culture 
according to its ideologies. The repressive 
power wants to ultimately shape the public 
opinion within a specific industry, and prevent 
any other shaping that contradicts it.  The first 
possible source to influence public opinion 
and formulate culture is the intellectual.  Thus, 
the effectiveness of the intellectual is either 
paralyzed or deactivated, if he chooses to 
encounter power violently. However, power 
mostly neglects those intellectuals who 
voluntarily choose to remain silent and solitary; 
thus, they are safe of harm. 
Although it seems superficially different, 
the modern cultural system appears to be 
the same in comparison with the traditional 
one.  Arab intellectuals represent, more or 
less, a continuation of that traditional system 
which accompanied the formation of Arab 
and Muslim civilization, when intellectuals, 
men of letters, artists, thinkers, or ashab al-
qalam (Arabic, literally: The pen holders, of Fr. 
littérateurs), propagated the ruling ideas and 
earned privileges in return.  This aspect of the 
problem of the modern intellectual-authority 
relationship is contingent on an inability 
of modern intellectuals in rethinking the 
presuppositions of their predecessors about 
Islamic culture, history, and tradition.  They are 
not immune to the same old reasoning illness 
that had occurred in their past.  Similarly, 
modern intellectuals either build projects 
under the supervision of the state ideology or 
construe their preconceived projects.  
In his Al-Muthaqqafun al-‘Arab wa al-
Turath: Al-Tahlil al-Nafsi li ‛Usab Jama‛i (Arab 
Intellectuals and Tradition: Psychoanalysis 
of A Collective Neurosis), Georges Tarabichi 
(1939-  ) diagnosed this mysterious chronic 
malady when he described the defection of 
Arab intellectuals regression to their tradition 
as Collective Neurosis resulted from mass 
frustration.(31)  However, this ‘diagnosis,’ 
due to its psychoanalytical orientation, does 
not interpret the continuity of traditional 
conventions in the modern cultural environment 
of Arab intellectuals. I believe that the best 
interpretation may not be psychological, but 
epistemological.  The continuity of traditional 
thinking in the modern era and the implied 
presence of traditional reasoning lead not only 
Ali Harb wages this war, not against 
the state authority as one may tend 
to think, but against the intellectuals 
and their projects and proclamations
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hinder the Arab intellectuals from ‘diagnosing’ 
the problems, but also from finding remedies.
Since the emergence of the Islamic state 
was accompanied by the era of tadwin, 
the duties of the intellectual class had been 
mapped out by the state as a service of 
consultation.  These duties could have been 
drastically changed, if the modern Arab states 
did not abort the birth of the secular state in the 
age of colonialism.  Similarly the birth of secular 
culture was aborted and eventually connected 
to authority over the society, to religion over 
secularism, and finally to traditionalism over 
rationalism.  In such circumstances neither 
Ernst Gellner’s conclusion that the ‘intellectual 
vocation’ does not exist, nor Edward Said’s 
characterization of the intellectual “as exile 
and marginal, as amateur, and as the author 
of a language that tries to speak the truth to 
power,”(32)  can describe the Arab inextricable 
intellectuals’ positions. This is because they 
do have functions for which they have been 
paid and they are not amateur, they are 
rather promoters of power. Each intellectual 
unconsciously absorbs the Arab ancient 
tradition in being subjugated to certain 
power and abandoning free thinking. They 
serve power’s cause explicitly and implicitly 
responding to an inherent tendency in their 
tradition.
The Arab intellectuals have been prone 
and unconsciously faithful to the traditional 
vocation of ancient Arab court writers.  In 
other words, they continue to provide advisory 
services to the governor and promote his 
ideas or even justify his mistakes and crimes. 
It seems that the birth of modern state did not 
affect the function of intellectuals, and their 
different activities.  Utilizing communication 
technologies and the media remained in the 
hands of the state.  We have models of such 
modern states, such as Egypt commanded 
by General Nasir during 19521970- and his 
successors, Iraq under the Ba‛th party during 
19682003-, and Syria since 1963. These 
countries, which have been reshaped by 
military coups, have contained the intellectuals 
who have forcibly or voluntarily co-opted 
within grand projects to formulate a systematic 
culture according to specific methodology and 
ideology.  Of course, there is a great deal of 
similarity between these Arab republic states 
and some Arab kingdoms and emirates, Saudi 
Arabia in particular. 
In principle, the more political, or even 
military, conflicts intensified over particular 
issues (national and trans-national), the 
more the role of Arab intellectuals grows and 
flourishes.  This notion can be validated by 
the fact that this kind of intelligentsia does 
not necessarily assume the role of leading 
the community, but has been led by the 
state ideology becoming a member in the 
ideological state apparatus.  Once the state 
ideology absorbs the intelligentsia in the 
space of authority, the cooption reaches its 
culmination. The full cooption of intelligentsia 
in the game of authority results in an 
indispensible consequence: the loss of liberty 
of reason.
The intellectuals will not be free and their 
Benda notices that the European 
clerks, at the end of nineteenth 
century, immersed themselves in 
politics and “began to play the game 
of political passions
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research is subjected to the major ideological 
market: the state ideology.  Those products 
definitely comply with the state specifications 
and eventually will be commoditized. For 
authority, the ideological conformity is a 
condition where the state can be strengthened 
by the writers.  But for the writers, the same 
ideological conformity is a condition where the 
independent thinking is extremely violated, the 
aura of the tamed writers is sadly vanished, 
and free voices are voluntarily muffled.  The 
intellectuals have lost their own way of thinking 
and have merged with the mentality of the 
mainstream thinking.  By incorporating them 
into ideological projects, or commoditized 
products, sponsored by the ideological power, 
the intellectuals have been disconcertedly 
transformed into state employees having 
specific tasks to perform in accordance with 
the instructions of the state and in conformity 
with its ideology.  
In our modern times, and due to the 
domination of Western civilization, Arab 
culture has witnessed a historical moment 
when a few Arab intellectuals could practice 
freethinking and relatively break with the 
authority mainstream ideology. In particular, 
these few could oppose the rigorous religious 
thought and politicized religion.  But why did 
these attempts of Arab intellectuals fail to 
form a new cultural environment in the Arab 
world?  One aspect of this dilemma lies, I 
believe, in the persistence of the traditional 
intel lectual-authority 
correlation (i.e. old Arab 
intellectuals had been 
prone to adopt positions 
of authority (rather) than 
opposing them, and this 
phenomenon can still 
be seen in the case of 
modern Arab intellectuals). 
According to the integration policy of the 
state regarding the role of the intellectuals, 
they systematically become ‘protectors of 
ideas,’ to use ‘Ali Harb’s expression(33), and 
not producers of ideas. Since, the ideas 
preexist and the only viable mission for the 
intellectuals is to protect and revere them, or 
even justify political blunders and atrocities. 
However, what is the price the intellectuals pay 
for the sacrifice of their liberty of thinking and 
commoditization of their research ‘labor’?  The 
state-institutionalized intellectuals have been 
the rigid cultural arms of the authority to direct 
and redirect the main streams of culture to 
only one state-controlled direction.  The state 
authority wants to gain legitimacy through the 
intellectuals, and intellectuals want to gain 
acceptability for their ideas through the state 
intellectual pseudo-legitimacy.
The modern Arab intellectual is associated 
with the authority through its educational 
institutions and media apparatus; this is 
the same position of his predecessor, the 
Arab intellectual who was emerged in the 
purview of the Arab-Islamic state where the 
mosques and other educational institutions 
were controlled by the state.  As it was rare 
for the state-dominated culture to establish 
independent schools and seminaries, the 
modern state-dominated culture did not 
succeed in establishing independent research 
centers and cultural institutions.  Therefore, 
the modern research 
centers and cultural 
institutions are now an 
‘objective correlative’ 
for the mosques during 
the Islamic Arab state 
(especially Umayyad 
Edward Said tried to create a 
conceptualized intellectual that is 
located among Gramsci’s, Benda’s, 
and Foucault’s intellectuals
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and Abbasid dynasties), in that the societal 
structures were entirely under the supervision 
of the state. 
One of the modern studies that dealt with this 
question is Nadia Ramsis Farah’s ‘Intellectual, 
State, and Civil Society.’  She studied the 
impact of civil society in reshaping the 
relationship between intellectuals and authority 
in the modern Arab world.  Normally, Arab 
civil society was sometimes negative, or even 
hostile in the way of forming this relationship.
(34)  The description of civil society’s role in the 
establishment of an intellectual relationship 
with authority is still gaining credibility in 
the Arab intellectual environment.  In other 
words, the civil society could be possibly 
adapted by the state to create consistency 
with its objectives; here civil society may 
indirectly intimidate intellectuals on behalf of 
the state, as is happening now in Iraq.  For 
instance, the politicization of religion in Iraq 
has tremendously motivated the Iraqi society 
to restrain freedom of expression; thereby, 
abandoning the constitution they had created 
and approved.  Consequently, intellectuals 
who fear society cannot but submit to authority. 
This cunning and feasible stratagem, in which 
we find examples in countries such as Iraq 
and Saudi Arabia in particular, where the 
community is well prepared to violently apply 
the mainstream views (politicized religious 
ones often), provides a contrary image of 
the role of intellectuals as drawn by Gramsci. 
Specifically, this is a prime negation of his 
concept in the Arab intelligentsia of the 
‘organic intellectual’ as a role that leads to 
an organization of the social domination and 
the state control through the civil society and 
political community.(35)
The intellectual provides advisory services 
to the politician, not only by promoting the 
latter’s ideas, but by justifying his actions and 
crimes as well.  The birth of the modern state 
has not influenced this major function of the 
intellectual, as his activities and access to 
modern technology and the media remain 
under the supervision of the state.  The models 
of some Arab modern states such as Egypt, 
Iraq, and Syria that are controlled by military 
regimes co-opted and tamed the intellectuals 
who had to join the state forcibly or voluntarily. 
It is therefore not a fully persuasive argument 
that ‘Ali Harb uses to link the flourishing of the 
profession of the intellectual in the Arab world 
with the domination of «struggle» (nidhal) over 
the cultural arenas and those who are related 
to the issues of thought and knowledge».(36) 
‘Ali Harb tried to explain the failure of Arab 
culture and called for a criticism addressed to 
the intellectual and his elitism, indeed he called 
for an ‘end’ of the intellectual, and suggested 
the creation of a new task that reshapes his 
role and his relationship with the fundamental 
values; values of freedom and justice, and his 
relationship with the political and social milieu.
(37)  I believe that the main argument here is 
about the historical roots of the prolonged 
relationship between intellectuals and 
authorities since the Umayyad (40132- AH / 
662750- AD) and Abbasid states (132 - 656 
AH, 6621258- AD).
The question is as follows, “To what extent 
can the intellectual change his status from 
The violence of the intellectual is symbolic 
that tries to create a complete break with 
the ideological constraints
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being a proponent of the state into an opponent 
of the state, thereby eliminating the patronage 
model?”  This question was raised in the 
context of Western culture during the Twelfth 
Century Middle Ages when the intellectuals 
were directed by the ideology of the Church. 
The response to this question is apparently 
associated with the internal movement of the 
West and external influence. What achieved 
this conversion is ultimately the primary 
knitting of the Christian West with the bright 
side of Muslim Arabs thinking, especially when 
Averroes’s books were translated into Latin 
and what so-called the «Latin Averroism» 
influenced scholastics in Medieval Europe. 
The Latin Averroism, according to Alain de 
Libera, separated religion from philosophy. It 
converted the twelfth and thirteenth centuries’ 
European philosophers from being ‘Organic 
intellectuals’ that cultivated their activities 
in the authority space, providing universities 
with cadres (scholars), into philosophers who 
developed their own discourses and opposed 
the authority of the church, and eventually 
developing a counter hegemony.(38)
In his work on the origins of the emergence 
of intellectuals, Muhammad ’Abid al-Jabiri 
(19362010-) maintains that the European 
intellectuals in the Middle Ages could not 
have achieved their radical change without 
Averroism, (p. 33).  But al-Jabiri’s conclusion 
was based on the origins of Islamic and 
European cultures.  However, my research 
focuses on those origins of Muslim-Arab 
culture that contributed to the establishment of 
a negative concept within which intellectuals 
work with the authority as promoters and 
supporters.  I believe that what mentally 
motivates modern Arab intellectuals in their 
attitudes and projects is their past; the past 
that permeates the Arabs’ modern world. 
Therefore, instead of being vehemently prone 
to sustain the self-assertiveness of Arabs by 
defending their contribution to the emergence 
of a new generation of European intellectuals, 
as al-Jabiri did, I tend to address this imbalance 
by disclosing this unseen thread that links our 
modern intellectual with his predecessors. 
Ultimately, both play the traditional destructive 
role in dealing with authorities as supporters 
and justifiers. 
Al-Jabiri realized that a referential absence 
needs to be filled when rethinking the origins 
of Arab intellectuals in the Arab tradition; 
because he believes that the modern 
intellectual practices thinking based on a 
previous intellectual.  This attempt moved him 
to pose the question ‘Who is the intellectual?’ 
because he wants first to specify who the 
intellectual is among writers, philosophers, 
scientists, scholars, poets, critics, historians, 
commentators, jurists, and mystics.  In order to 
determine the concept of the traditional Arab 
intellectual, al-Jabiri adapted the European 
concept of the intellectual into the Arab-Islamic 
civilization.(39)
It seems that the current problematic 
position of the Arab intellectuals is that the 
modern Arab culture has not been able to 
create an institutional and legal basis for the 
intellectual activities, so that the intellectuals 
can practice their work in an atmosphere of 
Arab intellectuals represent, more or 
less, a continuation of that traditional 
system which accompanied the 
formation of Arab and Muslim 
civilization
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freedom of expression, which is a necessary 
condition for free thinking. The totalitarian 
regimes, one-party states, tyranny, and the 
absence of cultural and legal institutions, 
cultural have made the implied system 
that has been embedded with the Arab 
culture to be an appropriate paradigm to 
the deteriorating situation of Arab politics, 
and to be unconsciously adopted by Arab 
intellectuals.
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